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This study compares and analyzes the development of idealistic versus phenomenological interpretations of Ch’eng wei-shih lun (CWSL) by Nobuyoshi Yamabe (山部能宜), L. Schmithausen, B. Kelner and J. Taber, and Koichi Takahashi(高橋晃一) versus D. Lusthaus, and critically examines the arguments and limitations of the two philosophical interpretations.
Idealistic interpreters generally translatevijñapti-mātra (唯識) into the representation (mental images) of a single mind. They pay attention to the theoretical consistency reduced to vijñapti-mātra in the relationship between the “self” and the “other.”
In contrast, Lusthaus’ phenomenological interpretation focuses on the practice ofvijñapti-mātra to overcome the dualism of grasped object-grasping subject (grāhya-grāhaka ). He attempts to examine “the mutual influence of all sentient beings” of the CWSL with intersubjectivity. He then endeavors to place Yogācāra-Vijñānavāda in the phenomenological tradition of Husserl and Merleau-Ponty.
The problem is that Buddhist phenomenology’s conclusion lies in recognizing ordinary external objects. Its radical conclusion causes an immediate backlash from researchers, leading to the idealistic interpretation. However, their attempts to reconstruct the idealistic interpretations do not finally resolve the problem of the relationship between the self and others; rather, it reveals their limitations.
The idealistic perspective lies in the single consciousness that denies external objects. The phenomenological perspective lies in plural streams of consciousness that presuppose external objects. However, CWSL and Viṃś deny the existence of material elements apart from one’s mind but do not deny the existence of plural streams of consciousness and regard the grasper-grasped as contamination/obstruction. Both raise problems of inconsistency with the Yogācāra argument when explaining the comprehensive features of the definitions ofvijñapti-mātra in the dissertations.
What we can reflect on from these debates about philosophical interpretation is that the dual premise of self and others is the core logic of both parts, and that a dual logic can never judge Yogācāra-Vijñānavāda.
Idealistic interpreters generally translate
In contrast, Lusthaus’ phenomenological interpretation focuses on the practice of
The problem is that Buddhist phenomenology’s conclusion lies in recognizing ordinary external objects. Its radical conclusion causes an immediate backlash from researchers, leading to the idealistic interpretation. However, their attempts to reconstruct the idealistic interpretations do not finally resolve the problem of the relationship between the self and others; rather, it reveals their limitations.
The idealistic perspective lies in the single consciousness that denies external objects. The phenomenological perspective lies in plural streams of consciousness that presuppose external objects. However, CWSL and Viṃś deny the existence of material elements apart from one’s mind but do not deny the existence of plural streams of consciousness and regard the grasper-grasped as contamination/obstruction. Both raise problems of inconsistency with the Yogācāra argument when explaining the comprehensive features of the definitions of
What we can reflect on from these debates about philosophical interpretation is that the dual premise of self and others is the core logic of both parts, and that a dual logic can never judge Yogācāra-Vijñānavāda.
이 연구의 목적은 루스트하우스의 현상학적 해석 및 그 논지에 반박하는 야마베 노부요시·슈미트하우젠·켈너와 테이버·타카하시 코이치의 관념론 해석 사이의 논쟁 전개양상을 분석하고, 각 주장과 한계를 비판적으로 검토하는데 있다.
관념론 해석은 대체로 유식[vijñapti-mātra ]을 단일한 마음 이미지, 정신적 표상으로 해석하고 ‘자아’-‘타자’ 관계에 있어서 유식으로 환원되는 이론적 정합성에 주목한다. 반면 루스트하우스의 현상학적 해석은 주관·객관[grāhya-grāhaka]의 이원성을 극복하기 위한 유식의 실천에 주목한다. 그는 유식을 심지적 유폐성으로 해석하고 모든 유정의 상호영향력을 상호주관성으로 해명하기 위해 유식사상을 현상학적 전통에 위치시키려 한다. 문제는 『불교현상학』의 결론이 외경을 인정하는데 있다. 그의 결론은 원인이 되어 관념론적 해석 연구자들의 즉각적인 반발을 불러일으키지만, 동시에 관념론적 관점의 해석을 재구축하려는 시도들은 최종적으로 자아와 타자의 문제를 봉합하지 못하는 한계를 분명하게 드러낸다.
『성유식론』과 『유식이십론』은 마법처럼 세계를 눈앞에 내어놓는 유식과 무경의 종지를 천명하는 동시에 암묵적으로 다수의 심상속 전제가 당연시되고, 자심·타심이 소취·능취의 존재론적 오염으로 간주된다. 유식의 정의에 포괄된 이러한 특징들은 객관을 부정하는 단일한 의식의 관점과 객관을 전제하는 상호주관성의 두 관점 중 어떤 것을 취해도 반드시 유식의 논지와 일치하지 않게 되는 정합성 문제가 불가피하게 불거진다. 철학적 해석논쟁으로부터 우리는 자·타의 이원적 전제가 양 진영의 핵심논리이며, 그들 관점의 이원적 논리로는 유식사상을 결코 재단할 수 없다는 점을 살필 수 있다.
관념론 해석은 대체로 유식[
『성유식론』과 『유식이십론』은 마법처럼 세계를 눈앞에 내어놓는 유식과 무경의 종지를 천명하는 동시에 암묵적으로 다수의 심상속 전제가 당연시되고, 자심·타심이 소취·능취의 존재론적 오염으로 간주된다. 유식의 정의에 포괄된 이러한 특징들은 객관을 부정하는 단일한 의식의 관점과 객관을 전제하는 상호주관성의 두 관점 중 어떤 것을 취해도 반드시 유식의 논지와 일치하지 않게 되는 정합성 문제가 불가피하게 불거진다. 철학적 해석논쟁으로부터 우리는 자·타의 이원적 전제가 양 진영의 핵심논리이며, 그들 관점의 이원적 논리로는 유식사상을 결코 재단할 수 없다는 점을 살필 수 있다.
- Viṃś
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◆ 약호 및 일차 문헌 ABBREVIATIONS AND PRIMARY SOURCES
◆ 이차 문헌 SECONDARY LITERATURE
- Publisher :Korean Association of Buddhist Studies
- Publisher(Ko) :불교학연구회
- Journal Title :Korea Journal of Buddhist Studies
- Journal Title(Ko) :불교학연구
- Volume : 71
- No :0
- Pages :157∼186
- DOI :https://doi.org/10.21482/jbs.71..20226.157
Korea Journal of Buddhist Studies
