Korea Journal of Buddhist Studies ISSN:1598-0642(Print) 불교학연구

This paper critically reviews Helmut Krasser’s argument (“Bhāviveka, Dharmakīrti and Kuārila,” 2012) that Bhāviveka’s works presuppose Kumārila’s, and thus, the latter’s floruit needs to be moved to the middle of the sixth century. It points out the difficulties and contradictions immanent in the grounds that Krasser adduces for his argument and notes that some of the opinions, which Krasser regards as Kumārila’s being quoted in Bhāviveka’s Madhyamakahṛdaya, were already known in the Buddhist tradition as attested in the *Mahāprajñāpāramitāśāstra (大智度論) and *Daśabhūmikaśāstra (十住毘婆沙論) translated by Kumārajīva (344-413 CE) and attributed to Nāgārjuna (150-250 CE). To undermine Krasser’s assumption that Kumārila was the first Mīmāṃsaka who problematized the existence of an omniscient being, it then quotes the concordant remarks of the three commentators on Kumārila’s Ślokavārttika that testify the existence of a certain Mīmāṃsaka(s) who first broached the topic of omniscience before Kumārila but after Śabara. This paper finally discusses one Mīmāṃsaka opinion introduced in Bhāviveka’s Madhyamakahṛdaya but explicitly disregarded by Kumārila as a forced interpretation of Śabara’s statement. Based on the materials collected here, it concludes that Bhāviveka’s Mīmāṃsaka opponent(s) is, most probably, an unknown pre-Kumārila (and post-Śabara) figure who nevertheless left dim traces in the textual sources at our disposal.