Korea Journal of Buddhist Studies ISSN:1598-0642(Print) 불교학연구

This study conveys the unconditioned dhamma according to the conception of the Abhidhamma knowledge. We know that the Abhid hamm philosophy has a various way to the investigation of dhamma. This line of thought is problematic in several respects in the Buddhist philosophy after arising of Buddhist sects. For Buddha's word only regarded as the truth, even though Buddha did not mention the unconditioned dhamma. On the respect of it, the requirement that a diverse skeptical hypothesis has been risen the question by the Bud dhist Theras. It would appear that, in principle, they thought skeptical hypothesis about the unconditioned dhamma regarded as a possibility of explanation. To appreciate the uncondi tioned dhamma over its skeptical question, we need to take into account the contents, as well as the form, of the Buddhist explan ations. Firstly Theravāda school posits the unconditioned dhamma as much as same meaning of nirvāṇa assuming that its characters are ultimately true. The reason is that Therāvadins did not consider the unconditioned dhamma as the empirical reality. Only they are followed the original meaning of early Buddhism concerning of the unconditioned dhamma. Secondly Mahāsāṅghika school, otherwise, takes the meaning of uncon ditioned dhamma to account for the relevant phenomena in some other fashions. They selected the unconditioned dhamma in the field of immaterial idealism or determinism. Therefore by bringing in these abstract explanations, Mahāsāṅghikas run the risk of taking on a more elaborate explanatory mechanism than the Theravādins. At any rate they are treated the unconditioned dhamma in the nine incorporeal categories following the immaterial conception. Thirdly Sarvāstivāda shcool could just as well argue that the unconditioned dhamma is simpler than Mahāsāṅghika's treatments, on the grounds that the unconditioned dhamma posits only three objects; ākāśa, pratisaṃkh yā-nirodha, and apratisaṃkhyā-nirodha. Moreover, it is far from clear that, all by itself, elucidating fewer entities is a theoretical virtue. And properly, if need to be, Sarvāstivādins could be revised the three kinds of unconditioned dhammas to lay down the role of the consequence between be existing and be non-existing. Lastly the Mahiṁsāsaka school alternatively accepted the unconditioned dhammas blending both theories of Mahāsāṅghika and Sarvāstivādin. Now, as will emerge shortly, I think there is something right about the claims that the Mahiṁsāsakas are less coherent and less simple than the theories connected with before two schools. Because they, in a strict sense, are only considered the unconditioned dhamma in the nature of suchness. But if explanatory coherence and simplicity on the view of Mahiṁ sāsaka are treated solely in structural terms, it should not be surprised that the nature of suchness do go through in the meaning of existence. Under this reason I suppose that the notion of suchness is a core idea to lead the Mahāyāna's conception of voidness caused the expansive explanation of unconditioned dhamma. Another methodological point requires some remarks about unconditioned dhamma to manifest the meaning of its variousness. So I have divided the unconditioned dhamma into two categories, one is the ultimate principle and the other is an immutable law. In this view, theoretical models are not constitutive of an ontology ― they are not the categorical contents ― but they are, nevertheless, universally accepted as the ultimate truth according to the Buddhist philosophy.I have so far been stressing the various notions to show the uncon ditioned dhamma according to the Abhidhamma philosophy. So I may well wish to be arguing that there are some schools, which did not concerning the unconditioned dhamma at all. Mostly the branch school of Theravāda was not built the edifice of the knowledge of the unconditioned dhamma; Dharmmottarīyas, Bhadrāyanīyas, Saṃmi tīyas, Dharmaguptakas, Kāśyapīyas, and Sautrāntika. They argue for the explanatory reality of the conditioned dhamma over any hypothesis which shares the structure of the unconditioned dhamma but which rejects its ontology. Realizing that the unconditioned dhammas are indefective, however, are not the same thing as spelling out precisely what their defects are. So I have undertaken here the investigation the unconditioned dhamma followed by the Abhidham mic traditional analysis.