Korean Journal of Buddhist Studies ISSN:1598-0642(Print) 불교학연구

This essay examines whether three kinds of cognition (三量) arise concurrently in the subjective part of the sixth mental consciousness (mano-vijñāna) or not, on the basis of the contention of the Chinese and Japanese scholars in the Faxiang School (法相宗). The scholars who asserted no-concurrence of the three kinds of cognition tried to prove their claim on the grounds of the citation, “one dharma doesn't have two functions of separate images (nimita; 相)” from the Yogācārabhūmi (瑜伽師地論). Each of the three kinds of cognition is a different way of knowing, and thus it conflicts with this citation that three kinds of cognition arise concurrently in the subjective part of the sixth mental consciousness. On the other hand, those who argued for concurrence (竝起) went on with three kinds of cognition with three kinds of objects (三類境) and five types of mind (五心). This is because three kinds of objects are the object parts, but they are also given to the subject part of the sixth mental consciousness simultaneously; the subject part needs three ways of knowing them so that it can cognize them. Also, as three characteristics of mind (三性), that is, the good, the evil, and the neither good nor evil, arise in the five types of mind concurrently, so three kinds of cognition also arise concurrently in the subjective part of the sixth mental consciousness.