Korea Journal of Buddhist StudiesISSN:1598-0642(Print)불교학연구회

I think that, when examining the Ālaya-vijñāna (阿梨耶識) in the Qixin-lun (起信論), two problems are raised. The first problem is whether the Qixin-lun tells the Dependent Arising (緣起) of the Ālaya-vijñāna or of the Tathāgata-garbha (如來藏). It is an obvious fact that the Ālaya-vijñāna is told in the Qixin-lun. The problem is its characteristic of the Combined Consciousness of True and False (眞妄和合識). Taking it as the Dependent Arising of the Tathāgata-garbha is stressing the view of the Substance (體性) out of the Three Greatnesses (三大) of the Qixin-lun; taking it as the Dependent Arising of the Ālaya-vijñāna is on the views of the Characteristics and Function (相用). After analyzing the Qixin-lun, I proposed that the term of the Ālaya-vijñāna, which is in the first phrase of the Gate of Arising and Ceasing (生滅門) of the Qixin-lun, must be interpreted on the base of the views of the Characteristics and Function. The second is whether the concept of the Ālaya-vijñāna in the Qixin-lun is an extension of the Dilun-zong School (地論宗) based on the Shidi-jing-lun (十地經論) and the Lengjia-jing (楞伽經) or an extension of the tradition of the Shedasheng-lun (攝大乘論). I asserted the necessity of approaching the Mind of Sentient Beings (衆生心) and the Ālaya-vijñāna in the Qixin-lun from a point of view of the theory of Three Natures (三性) of the Consciousness-Only Buddhism. The Qixin-lun’s accurate and separating use of terms of the One Mind (一心) and the Mind of Sentient Beings reflects its theoretical intention to use the different terms according to different levels of the concept. In this respect, it does not accord with the Qixin-lun’s intention to take the first phrase of the Gate of Arising and Ceasing of the Qixin-lun, as the Dependent Arising of the Tathāgata-garbha. From these facts, I proposed that it was proper to understand the Ālaya-vijñāna, or, further, the Mind of Sentient Beings as the Nature of Dependence on Others (依他性) of the theory of Three Natures of the Consciousness-Only Buddhism. After analysing the Commentaries’ interpretations on the Ālaya-vijñāna in the Qixin-lun, I made a result as follows: Both the Tanyan (曇延)’s Commentary and its influencer, the Kyousho-oku Text (杏雨書屋本), or the oldest commentary in existence, interpret the Qixin-lun with adopting the theories of the Consciousness-Only Buddhist texts translated by Zhendi (眞諦). They are scarcely affected by the Dilun-zong School, nor do they adopt texts of the Tathāgata-garbha Buddhism like the Lengjia-jing or the Shengman-jing (勝鬘經). On the other hand, the Jingying (淨影)’s Commentary adopts the Lengjia-jing and the Shengman-jing, which form the base of the Dilun-zong School’s theories, with interpreting the Two-fold Gate and the first phrase of the Gate of Arising and Ceasing of the Qixin-lun. It causes the result of excluding the core theoretical structure of the Two-fold Gate, I think, which is strictly applied and maintained in the Qixin-lun. Especially, identifying the Substance of the Gate of Suchness as that of the Gate of Arising and Ceasing, the Jingying’s Commentary includes the former Gate into the latter, which makes the Substance (Tathāgata-garbha or Suchness) play a larger role in the latter and produces result of the nominal Ālaya-vijñāna. The Wonhyo (元曉)’s Commentary, while adopting the Lengjia-jing and the Shengman-jing like the Fazang (法藏)’s Commentary or the Jingying’s, does not damage the Qixin-lun’s intention to establish the Two-fold Gate. As a result, while adopting the same part of the Lengjia-jing, the Wonhyo’s Commentary has a different view of interpreting from the Jingying’s. Also, as drastically adopting views of the Neo Consciousness-Only Buddhism, the Wonhyo’s Commentary stresses the position of the Ālaya-vijñāna in the Gate of Arising and Ceasing. From these facts, I concluded that the historical context of the Qixin-lun’s thought was far from the Dilun-zong School’s theories.