Korea Journal of Buddhist Studies ISSN:1598-0642(Print) 불교학연구

The purpose of this study is to supplement the criticisms of utilitarianism from the Buddha’s teachings and to explore whether Buddhist ontology can imply a consequentialist moral bearer. The gist of Derek Parfit’s argument in response to the impersonality critique of utilitarian values was to treat the criterion of personal identity as a kind of continuum, neutralizing self-interest in favor of psychological reductionism. Reductionism has the logical strength of providing a consequentialist justification of altruistic concerns as agents of value realization for the greater good. However, it is also criticized for being unclear about the point of attribution of responsibility for actions and for weakening the foundations of utilitarianism by eliminating the potential for future experience and responsibility. Meanwhile, the implications of personal identity as defined by a nonlinear perception of the twelve links of dependent arising can be seen in a similar vein in that they exclude sameness, but the idappaccayatā and simultaneity inherent in interdependent arising provide a clear point of attribution for responsibility for acts and consequences. Therefore, by examining the mediating grounds that ensure the continuity of personal identity as perceived in reductionism and nonlinear dependent arising, we identify the differences in ethical compatibility that emerge from the two positions. Through a discussion of the problems that reductionism has failed to solve via the doctrine of dependent co-arising, this paper show that the ontology of anātman is valid within contemporary consequentialist ethical theory.