투고논문

31 March 2022. pp. 109∼134
Abstract
This paper discusses the prerequisites for deliberations on the free will problem of artificial intelligence, with reference to Alex Garland’s 2015 film “Ex Machina.” The implications of Buddhist non-self theory are examined against the common idea that free will originates from the self. From a viewpoint common to Buddhism and neuroscience, possible interpretations of the film are suggested based on the results of recent robotics experiments and technological feasibility.
The Buddhist doctrine of no-self does not allow an agent à la ātman. The concept of ‘self as a useful fiction’ facilitates the notion of ‘action without an agent.’ This concept is also useful for explaining the integrated internal representation of ‘I’ or the domain-general thinking ability. In the film, Ava behaves comfortingly in human-suitable spaces in a human-like way. That means that Ava’s self-model has achieved same level of usefulness as the human self-model. It seems no longer possible to argue that artificial intelligence cannot have a ‘mind’ solely by the fact that it is constructed differently from humans. The boundaries between living things and non-living things have become blurred and many-layered.
However, there are clear differences in the cognitive structure of humans and artificial intelligence systems. Current artificial intelligence technology can read, analyze, and generate emotional expressions. The emotional experience and self-reflective consciousness of artificial intelligence remain hard problems from both practical and theoretical standpoints. In discussions of the free will of artificial intelligence, it is not necessary to presuppose the idea of ​​the self like ātman; instead, the experience of emotion and the generation of consciousness are conditions that must be considered before exploring the issue of free will.
이 논문은 2015년 알렉스 가랜드 감독의 영화 <엑스마키나(Ex Machina)>를 통해, 인공지능의 자유의지 문제를 바라볼 때 놓치지 말아야 할 조건들을 다룬다. 우선 자유의지가 자아에서 비롯한다고 믿는 관념에 대하여, 불교의 무아설이 지니는 의미를 살펴보았다. 이에 대해 과학적으로 확인된 사실과 기술적인 외형 구현이 가능한 것을 중심으로 이 영화를 바라보는 불교와 과학의 접점을 논의하였다.
불교의 무아설은 아트만과 같은 행위자를 인정하지 않는다. 이와 같이 ‘행위자 없는 행위’를 해명하기 위해서는 ‘유용한 허구로서의 자아’라는 개념이 설득력 있게 다가온다. ‘나’라고 하는 통합된 내적 표상이나 일반적 사고 능력은 그 유용성의 다른 표현이 될 것이다. 에이바는 인간이 활동하는 공간에서 인간처럼 움직이는 데 전혀 어려움을 겪지 않는다. 에이바의 자기 모델은 사람의 자기 모델과 동일한 수준의 유용성을 확보했다고 볼 수 있다. 인공지능이 인간과 다르게 구성되었다는 사실만으로 ‘마음’을 지닐 수 없다고 논증하는 것은 더이상 가능하지 않은 듯하다. 유정물과 무정물을 가르는 경계가 모호해지고, 그 층위가 보다 촘촘해졌다고 말할 수 있다.
하지만 양자의 인지적 구조에는 명백한 차이점이 있다. 현재 인공지능 기술은 감정표현을 판독·분석·재현할 수 있지만, 감정을 경험하고 자기를 인식하는 인공지능은 현실적·이론적으로 구현할 방법이 보이지 않는다. 인공지능의 자유의지 논의에 있어서 아트만적 자아의 관념을 전제할 필요는 없지만, 감정의 경험이나 의식의 발생은 자유의지 문제를 탐구하기에 앞서 반드시 살펴보아야 할 조건들인 셈이다.
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Information
  • Publisher :Korean Association of Buddhist Studies
  • Publisher(Ko) :불교학연구회
  • Journal Title :Korea Journal of Buddhist Studies
  • Journal Title(Ko) :불교학연구
  • Volume : 70
  • No :0
  • Pages :109∼134