투고논문

30 June 2023. pp. 29∼55
Abstract
This paper examines the Buddhist theory of error (khyāti) in the Nyāyamañjarī by Bhaṭṭa Jayanta. Jayanta uses the term vijñānādvaitavāda, the non-dualism of cognition, to refer to the position of later Yogācāra Buddhists. The term means that cognition’s subjective and objective aspects are equivalent to cognition itself. To criticize vijñānādvaitavāda, Jayanta introduces the debate between Yogācāra and Naiyāyika, focusing on the issue of whether the form (ākāra) belongs to cognition or external objects. Yogācāra argues that ākāra belongs to cognition, while Jayanta presents a counterargument that it belongs to external objects. In this context, Jayanta refutes Yogācāra’s theories of erroneous cognitions: “revelation of the non-existent” (asatkhyāti) and “revelation of the cognition itself” (ātmakhyāti). First, Jayanta refutes asatkhyāti by employing an inductive argument that there is no instance of an error caused by a completely non-existent thing (ekāntāsat). Next, Jayanta points out some logical problems of ātmakhyāti: cognition cannot be divided into two aspects either simultaneously or sequentially. In other words, Jayanta undermines the simultaneous cause-and-effect relationship between the apprehender (grāhaka) and the apprehended (grāhya), maintaining that if two factors are simultaneous then the identity of the two cannot be determined. Moreover, Jayanta disputes the sequential relationship between them since it conflicts with the principle of momentariness (kṣaṇikatā). This argument responds to the reasoning for the simultaneity and sequentiality of cognition, as shown in the Ālambanaparīkṣā verse 7ab by Dignāga. A closer reading of the theory of error in the Nyāyamañjarī confirms the internalist and externalist tendencies of Yogācāra and Nyāya, respectively.
이 글에서는 9세기 경 인도 카슈미르에서 활동한 자얀따(Bhaṭṭa Jayanta)의 『냐야만자리』(Nyāyamañjarī, 이하 NM)에서 다뤄지고 있는 후기 유가행파의 착오론 비판에 대해 소개하고 그 함의를 확인한다. 여기서 자얀따는 불교 유가행파를 지칭하며 인식비이원론(vijñānādvaitavāda)이라는 명칭을 사용하고 있는데, 이 명칭에는 유가행파가 인식의 주관적 측면과 대상적 측면을 모두 인식으로 등치시키고 있다는 이해가 함축되어 있다. 인식비이원론을 비판하기 위해 자얀따는 ‘형상(ākāra)은 대상의 것인가, 인식의 것인가’라는 문제를 설정하고 유가행파와 가상의 논쟁을 펼친다. 이 문제에서 유가행파는 형상이 인식에 속한다고 논증하며, 자얀따는 형상이 외부 대상에 속한다는 입장에서 그에 대한 반론을 제시한다. 이 가운데 착오(khyāti)가 발생하는 방식에 대한 논의가 주요하게 다뤄지는데, 이때 유가행파의 착오론은 ‘비실재의 발현’(asatkhyāti)과 ‘인식 자체의 발현’(ātmakhyāti)으로 구획된다. 먼저 ‘비실재의 발현’에 대한 비판의 경우, 자얀따는 일상적으로 발생하는 착오의 여러 예시를 제시하면서 착각의 일종으로 발현되는 대상이 ‘완전한 비존재’가 아니라는 사실을 귀납적으로 논증하는 전략을 취한다. 다른 한편 ‘인식 자체의 발현’의 경우에 있어서 자얀따는 파악주관과 파악대상을 모두 인식 그 자체라고 주장할 때 발생하는 논리적 난점들을 지적하고 있다. 이 글에서는 NM에 나타난 착오론의 양상을 통해 냐야학파의 외재론적 입장과 불교도의 내재론적 입장을 확인하고, 동시에 형상(ākāra)의 진실성을 둘러싸고 유가행파가 두 노선으로 나뉘는 맥락을 구체적으로 확인한다.
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Information
  • Publisher :Korean Association of Buddhist Studies
  • Publisher(Ko) :불교학연구회
  • Journal Title :Korea Journal of Buddhist Studies
  • Journal Title(Ko) :불교학연구
  • Volume : 75
  • No :0
  • Pages :29∼55