Korean Journal of Buddhist Studies ISSN:1598-0642(Print) 불교학연구

The modern commentator Mark Siderits argues that in the second verse of the Viṃśikā (Twenty Verses), Vasubandhu’s opponent, who criticizes idealism on the basis of spatial limitation, commits the fallacy of “begging the question.” This is because, by presupposing spatiality, the opponent implicitly affirms the existence of physical matter, the very point under dispute. However, the claim that the existence of mind-independent objects can be inferred from the premise that only physical entities occupy spatial locations seems to be a position unique to Vasubandhu, rather than a reflection of broader philosophical currents of his time. If this is the case, Vasubandhu may have committed a significant philosophical error. Nevertheless, given the intellectual context of Vasubandhu’s era, it may be overly demanding to expect a firm commitment to the premise that “only physical objects can have spatial location.” The view that Siderits treats as a common-sense intuition appears to have gained serious traction only in later stages of the Yogācāra tradition, particularly in thinkers such as Sthiramati. This development can be understood either as an internal deepening of the doctrine of vijñaptimātratā or as the result of external influences, such as the impact of Jain philosophical thought.