An Interpretation of the Hard Problem of the Knowledge of Those Who Know Other Minds (paracittavidāṃ-jñ̃ānam, 他心智) in Viṃśatikā from the Perspective of Cognitive Science

doi:10.21482/jbs.65..202012.87

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An Interpretation of the Hard Problem of the Knowledge of Those Who Know Other Minds (paracittavidāṃ-jñ̃ānam, 他心智) in Viṃśatikā from the Perspective of Cognitive Science 『유식이십론』 타심지 문제의 인지과학적 해명: 정현주
Hyun Joo Chung; 전남대학교 호남불교문화연구소 전임연구원

Senior Researcher / Honam Center for Buddhist Studies Chonnam National University

31 December 2020. pp. 87-113

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Abstract

The primary purpose of this essay is to examine the hard problem of paracittavidāṃ-jñ̃ānam (他心智) of the Viṃśatikā and Vasubandhu's explanation for maintaining the consistency of rejecting grasped object (grāhya, 所取) and grasping subject (grāhaka, 能取) in light of H. Maturana's biological research.

The hard problem of paracittavidāṃ-jñ̃ānam, the last objection by the proponents of external objects, implies a logical contradiction arisen from that the relation between oneself and the others in “the knowledge of the one who knows the mind of the other” is not consistent with Vasubandhu's argument, “vijñapti-mātra” (唯識無境, cognitive closure). The questions of modern researchers such as T. E. Wood and Yamabe Nobuyoshi (山部能宜) are also closely related to that problem.

To understand the hard problem, I first examine the opponent's objection and its dualistic contradiction inherent in an utterance of paracittavidāṃ-jñ̃ānam. To understand the dualistic inconsistency, I review J. Monod's critique of the parapsychology of science, and then look into Autopoiesis and Cognition: the process of bringing forth an objective world through using our own changes of states as describers that specify the objects that constitute it. Finally, with the cognitive scientific grounds, I analyze Vasubandhu's resolution on paracittavidāṃ-jñ̃ānam as grāhya-grāhaka vikalpa (分別, distinction).

Vasubandhu's explanation regarding other minds and one's own is as follows: (1) Knowledges of one's own mind and of those of others are the distinction of grāhya-grāhaka, which in the interpersonal domain operates as the mutual restriction of vijñapti due to their dominant influence (adhipatya, 增上力) on each other. (2) The distinction of grāhya-grāhaka belongs to the realm of logical reasoning and is not as they appear. This result affirms that both knowledges belong to the triple world (traidhātu) and the aspect of vijñapti-mātra and also that how the objects are brought forth like a delusion by cognition only as if they were externally independent of the cognitive functions.

Keywords

paracittavidāṃ jñ̃ānam

Viṃśatikā

analogy of timira

cognitive blindness

Maturana and Varela

J. Monod

parapsychology of science

ontological contamination

epistemological contradiction

eliminating object and subject

이 연구의 목적은 『유식이십론』에서 실재론자가 제기하는 타심지[他心智, paracittavidāṃ jñānam] 문제와 세친(Vasubandhu)의 해명을 움베르또 마뚜라나(H. Maturana)의 신경생물학적 연구 성과에 의거해 분석･검토하여 논서가 소취･능취 분별[grāhya-grāhaka vikalpa]의 제거라는 일관된 정합성을 유지하고 있다는 점을 확인하고 나아가 기존 문헌학적 연구의 한계에 대한 대안적 관점을 제시하는 데 있다. 외경 실재론자가 제기하는 타심지 문제는, 유식무경[vijñapti-mātra]을 주장할 때 “타자의 마음을 아는 자의 지식”이라는 용어에서 드러나는 자･타 관계의 논리적 모순을 의미한다. 우드(T. E. Wood)나 야마베(山部能宜)와 같은 동시대 연구자들의 의문도 이 문제와 밀접하게 관련되어 있다.

타심지를 이해하기 위해 먼저 실재론자의 문제제기와 여기에 내재한 이원론적 모순을 분석한다. 이원론적 모순을 이해하기 위해 과학의 초심리학(parapsychology)에 대한 자끄 모노(J. Monod)의 비판을 검토하고, 『자기생성과 인지』 등의 해명을 통해 이원적 세계를 마법처럼 꺼내놓는 관찰하기의 존재론을 고찰한다. 마지막으로 세친의 해명과 입장을 분석한다. 세친은 자･타심과 관련하여 논서에서 다음과 같이 언급한다. (1) 자･타심지는 대인관계적 영역에서 인지적 실체로 작용하는 능취･소취의 분별이다. (2) 집단적 훈습에 의한 식의 증상력으로 인해 상호 인식작용이 가능하다. (3) 인식작용은 대상(자･타심)으로 사현하는 심리적 영역만을 수반한다. (4) 이취 분별은 논리적 추론의 영역이며 여실하지 않은 지식의 영역이다. 따라서 자･타심지는 삼계의 하나이며 인지적 맹목을 함축하는 비문증 비유에 포괄된다. 이 결과는 유식무경의 양상이 인식작용에 의해서만 대상이 망상처럼 꺼내지는 방식에 준거한다는 점을 재확인한다.

키워드

타심지

『유식이십론』

비문증의 비유

자･타의 연결관계

인지적 맹목

마뚜라나와 바렐라

과학의 초심리학

존재론적 오염

인식론상의 모순

References

◆ 약호 및 일차 문헌 ABBREVIATIONS AND PRIMARY SOURCES

Viṃś Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi: Deux Traités de Vasubandhu: Viṃśatikā et Triṃśikā. ed. Sylvain Lévi, Paris: Bibliotheque de l'Ecole des Hautes Etudes, 1925.
VŚṬ Prakaraṇa-Viṃśatikaṭīkā=Rab tu byed pa nyi shu pa'i 'grel bshad, P 5566 (vol. 113), Si, 201b81-232a8.
CHO, Hyeon Soo (조현수) tr. 2010. Jacques L. Monod. 『우연과 필연』 [Le Hasard et la Nécessité: Essai sur la philosophie naturelle de la biologie moderne], Seoul: 궁리 (Kungree Press).
MATURANA, H. R. 2008. "The biological foundations of virtual realities and their implication for human existence", Constructivist Foundations vol. 3, no. 2, 109-114.

◆ 이차 문헌 SECONDARY LITERATURE

MATURANA, H. R.. 1995. "Biology of self-consciousness", in Consciousness: Distinction and reflection, G. Tratteur ed., Naples: Bibliopolis, 145-175.
MATURANA, H. R.. 1988. "Reality: The search for objectivity or the quest for a compelling argument", The Irish Journal of Psychology, vol. 9, no. 1, 25-82. 10.1080/03033910.1988.10557705
MATURANA, H. R. and VARELA F. J. 1980. Autopoiesis and Cognition: The Realization of the Living, Dordrecht: D. Reidel. 10.1007/978-94-009-8947-4
SILK, Jonathan A. 2018. Materials Toward the Study of Vasubandhu's Viṃśikā (I): Sanskrit and Tibetan Critical Editions of the Verses and Autocommentary; An English Translation and Annotations. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Department of South Asian Studies.
WOOD, Tomas E. 1994. Mind only: A philosophical and doctrinal analysis of the Vijñānavāda, New Deli: Motilal Banarsidass Publishers.
YAMABE, Nobuyoshi (山部能宜). 1998. 「Self and Other in the Yogācāra Tradition」, 『北畠典生博士古稀記念論文集日本仏教文化論叢』上巻 (Essays on Japanese Buddhist Culture in Honor of Dr. Tensei Kitabatake on the Occasion of his Seventieth Birthday I), Kyoto: 文昌堂(bunkoudo), 15-41.

Information

Publisher :Korean Association of Buddhist Studies
Publisher(Ko) :불교학연구회
Journal Title :Korea Journal of Buddhist Studies
Journal Title(Ko) :불교학연구
Volume : 65
No :0
Pages :87-113
DOI :https://doi.org/10.21482/jbs.65..202012.87

[1] Viṃś Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi: Deux Traités de Vasubandhu: Viṃśatikā et Triṃśikā. ed. Sylvain Lévi, Paris: Bibliotheque de l'Ecole des Hautes Etudes, 1925.

[2] VŚṬ Prakaraṇa-Viṃśatikaṭīkā=Rab tu byed pa nyi shu pa'i 'grel bshad, P 5566 (vol. 113), Si, 201b81-232a8.

[3] CHO, Hyeon Soo (조현수) tr. 2010. Jacques L. Monod. 『우연과 필연』 [Le Hasard et la Nécessité: Essai sur la philosophie naturelle de la biologie moderne], Seoul: 궁리 (Kungree Press).

[4] MATURANA, H. R. 2008. "The biological foundations of virtual realities and their implication for human existence", Constructivist Foundations vol. 3, no. 2, 109-114.

[5] MATURANA, H. R.. 1995. "Biology of self-consciousness", in Consciousness: Distinction and reflection, G. Tratteur ed., Naples: Bibliopolis, 145-175.

[6] MATURANA, H. R.. 1988. "Reality: The search for objectivity or the quest for a compelling argument", The Irish Journal of Psychology, vol. 9, no. 1, 25-82. 10.1080/03033910.1988.10557705

[7] MATURANA, H. R. and VARELA F. J. 1980. Autopoiesis and Cognition: The Realization of the Living, Dordrecht: D. Reidel. 10.1007/978-94-009-8947-4

[8] SILK, Jonathan A. 2018. Materials Toward the Study of Vasubandhu's Viṃśikā (I): Sanskrit and Tibetan Critical Editions of the Verses and Autocommentary; An English Translation and Annotations. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Department of South Asian Studies.

[9] WOOD, Tomas E. 1994. Mind only: A philosophical and doctrinal analysis of the Vijñānavāda, New Deli: Motilal Banarsidass Publishers.

[10] YAMABE, Nobuyoshi (山部能宜). 1998. 「Self and Other in the Yogācāra Tradition」, 『北畠典生博士古稀記念論文集日本仏教文化論叢』上巻 (Essays on Japanese Buddhist Culture in Honor of Dr. Tensei Kitabatake on the Occasion of his Seventieth Birthday I), Kyoto: 文昌堂(bunkoudo), 15-41.

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