Korean Journal of Buddhist Studies ISSN:1598-0642(Print) 불교학연구

This paper examines Dharmakīrti’s response to the redundancy problem arising from the logical equivalence of the second characteristic, anvaya (positive concomitance), and the third characteristic, vyatireka (negative concomitance), in Dignāga’s theory of the three characteristics of a valid logical reason (trairūpya). Dignāga uses the restrictive particle eva to define these two characteristics in his Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti (PSV). The propositions expressing anvaya and vyatireka consequently form a pair of contrapositives and are logically equivalent, raising the question of why they should be stated as separate characteristics of a valid reason. The paper first traces the emergence of this problem in Dignāga’s Pramāṇasamuccaya (PS) and PSV, then analyzes Dharmakīrti’s responses in the Pramāṇaviniścaya (PVin) and Hetubindu (HB). Dharmakīrti accepts that a statement of either anvaya or vyatireka can indicate the other, but maintains that this mutual indication does not imply their essential identity. Distinguishing statements used in an argument (prayoga) from the characteristics (rūpa) themselves, he maintains that presence in similar instances and absence from dissimilar instances are distinct characteristics. According to Dharmakīrti, one statement can indicate the other because of the force (sāmarthya) of a proposition containing a restriction (niyama), rather than because of mutual implication or inclusion. Finally, the study compares the Sanskrit HB, Hetubinduṭīkā, and Hetubinduṭīkāloka with the relevant Tibetan translations and the modern critical editions. It argues that the Sanskrit materials, which consistently deny mutual dependence, implication, and inclusion between the two characteristics, accord more closely with Dharmakīrti’s original intention. His response can therefore be understood as an attempt to preserve Dignāga’s trairūpya theory while resolving its inherent redundancy problem.