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This article aims to observe Dignāga’s apohavāda on a word’s meaning (śabdārtha) to act successfully between the relations of qualifier-qualificand (viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyabhāva) and the relations of co‐referentiality or co‐occurrence (sāmānādhikaraṇya), which happens to raise difficulties of two indivisible words applied to a certain object (viṣaya).
As we know, Dignāga’ apoha theory is such that a word denotes its own meaning (svārtha) by resorting to the exclusion of others (arthāntarāpoha), which is its basis [=locus] for application (pravṛttinimitta).
In the compound nīlotpala, the former nīla is a word for a common meaning (sāmānyaśabda) in which it denotes something blue, while the latter utpala is a word for a specific meaning (viśeṣaśabda) in which it characterizes a particular lotus. Each of them has the exclusion of others respectively through apoha’s function, namely, the exclusion of non‐blue things and that of non‐lotuses. A question arises: How could the exclusion of non‐blue things and that of non‐lotuses be identical with the same object which consist in exclusively two kinds of exclusion; how could the two different words establish the relation of qualifier-qualificand and that of co‐referentiality?
To resolve these difficulties, Dignāga discusses in PS(V) 5.14 that the exclusion of non‐blue things and that of non‐lotuses are different from each other, because the non‐blue things and the non‐loutses, which are what is to be excluded, are different from each other. Two different words with different meanings can thus have be established such relations by his original theory.
Conclusionally, in PS(V) 5.36d Dignāga argues that his apoha theory is superior to (guṇotkarṣāt) other schools’ tadvat theory because of non-existence of four mistakes (doṣa) on word’s meaning (śabdārtha), and therefore a word could denote things exclusively as qualified by the exclusion of others (arthāntaranivṛttiviśiṣṭān).
우리의 일상적 언어 행위(vyāvahāra)는 무엇에 대한 지향성이 있다. 본 논문에서는 말(śabda)이 어떤 구성 원리에 따라 ‘자신의 의미’(svārtha)를 정확히 지시・표현・전달・현현하는가에 대한 사례를 중심으로 살펴보고자 한다. 특히, 디그나가(Dignāga)는 자신의 『쁘라마나삼웃짜야(브릿띠)』(Pramāṇasamuccaya(vṛtti), 이하 PS(V)) 제5장에서 타 학파 논사인 바르뜨리하리(Bhartṛhari)의 『바키야빠디야』(Vākyapadīya, 이하 VP)에서 몇 개의 게송을 인용[삽입]함으로써 그의 독창적 아포하(apoha) 이론을 전개하고 있다.
한편 바르뜨리하리는 VP에서 복합어 ‘검은 참깨’(kṛṣṇatila)의 사례를 들어 두 개의 말들이 갖는 ‘한정자-피한정자의 관계’(viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyabhāva)나 혹은 ‘동일지시대상’ (sāmānādhikaraṇya)의 난제를 해결하는 반면, 디그나가는 PS(V)에서 복합어 ‘푸른 연꽃’(nīlotpala)의 사례를 들어 서로 다른 두 말들의 결합 실현가능성(sambandhasaukarya)을 논의하고 있다.
특히, PS(V) 5.36d에서 디그나가는 자신의 아포하 이론은 바르뜨리하리의 ‘보편의 담지자’(tadvat) 견해가 갖는 네 가지 오류(doṣa)들이 전혀 없는 탁월한 장점이 있기 때문에(guṇotkarṣāt) 말은 타자의 배제를 통해 그 대상(viṣaya)을 표현할 수 있다고 주장한다(arthāntaranivṛttiviśiṣṭān). 그러나 여기에서 그의 이론이 갖는 기능적 측면에 대한 반론자의 비판이 예상된다. 즉, 두 개의 말들로 구성된 복합어에서 ‘이중 배제’로 인해 하나의 동일지시대상을 타당하게 표현할 수 있을까 하는 문제이다. 따라서 필자는 이 논문에서 디그나가가 ‘푸른 연꽃’과 ‘까마귀 둥지’ 등의 사례 분석을 통해 어떻게 이 난제를 극복하고, 또한 그가 말하는 진정한 ‘말의 의미’에 대해 구명해 보고자 한다.
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- Publisher :Korean Association of Buddhist Studies
- Publisher(Ko) :불교학연구회
- Journal Title :Korean Journal of Buddhist Studies
- Journal Title(Ko) :불교학연구
- Volume : 57
- Pages :261-281


Korean Journal of Buddhist Studies






