Korean Journal of Buddhist Studies ISSN:1598-0642(Print) 불교학연구

This article examines whether the limitations attributed to Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy in previous comparative studies of Buddhism and Merleau-Ponty are justified, and argues that his philosophy can also be interpreted from a Mahāyāna Buddhist perspective. The reversible structure of Merleau-Ponty’s ontology has often been compared with the Buddhist structure of dependent origination. Some comparative studies, however, criticize his philosophy from a religious perspective. They maintain that although Merleau-Ponty challenges the dualistic worldview of the substantialist Western philosophical tradition, his philosophy remains confined to describing the existential situation of the self and the world and therefore fails to offer a path to salvation.
This criticism permits a twofold response. On the one hand, it is valid insofar as Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy does not explicitly aim to provide a path to religious salvation. On the other hand, it remains limited because his account of the relationship between philosophy and religion, together with his understanding of flesh as a field of diverse possible meanings, allows his philosophy to be interpreted as suggesting the possibility of existential salvation through the language of flesh.
To demonstrate this possibility, the article focuses on the structural affinity between Wonhyo’s philosophy and that of Merleau-Ponty. It first examines the structural points of convergence between One Mind and flesh and then identifies a shared practical logic between Hwajaeng, which unfolds on the basis of One Mind, and Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology of language. On this basis, the article clarifies the soteriological significance implicit in Merleau-Ponty’s ontology and answers previous Buddhist criticisms of his philosophy. It concludes that the possibility of existential self-transformation inherent in Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy can be reinterpreted soteriologically from a Mahāyāna Buddhist perspective.